Analysing Spain v Japan from the first matchday of this year’s SheBelieves Cup.

Spain’s possession game

Spain dominated the game from the early proceedings with their strong possession game against the 4-4-2 mid-block of Japan. In particular, the impressive distribution of centre-back Andrea Pereira helped Spain to break through the midfield pressing of Japan on several occasions in the game.

An example of this occurred just seven minutes into the game in the move which led to Spain going 1-0 up:

In the scene above, something that can firstly be noted is the positioning of Guijarro and Putellas as the #8s for Spain. This arrangement between them was common, whereby Guijarro would remain in the right halfspace, but Putellas would move from her nominal starting position in the left halfspace into the centre.

As previously mentioned, key to Spain’s success was the playmaking of Pereira. With short, diagonal dribbles outside to escape the pressing of the Japanese strikers who were focused on preventing passes into Torrecilla at #6, Pereira was able to look for line-breaking passes through the Japan midfield.

The positioning of Guijarro and Putella in the gaps between Nakajima, Sugita and Muira in the Japan midfield made it especially difficult for the left central midfielder of Japan to prevent Spain from progressing through this zone. In the scene above, for example, Guijarro’s slight diagonal movement increases the gap between Sugita and Muira, creating more space for Pereira’s pass into Putellas.

The two features of the scene above which were less typical of Spain’s possession structure are the positioning of striker Hermoso and left winger Caldentey. More often, Hermoso would drift into the left halfspace in order to provide presence in that zone given that Putellas would usually vacate it. On the occasion leading up to Spain’s first goal though, Hermoso’s positioning in the right halfspace actually draws out Minami, which helps facilitate the one-touch pass from Putellas to set right winger Cardona in behind the Japan defence. Cardona’s involvement in this scene was fairly typical of her involvement more broadly, as she was much more focused on depth than her left side counterpart, often starting wide before making runs off the shoulder of Endo, Japan’s left back.

Caldentey meanwhile had a very free role, able to move long distances from her nominal position on the left wing. In attacks through the left, she could be seen dropping into the left halfspace to help facilitate combinations through this zone. Other times, she would drift all the way across into the centre or even in the right halfspace to provide overloads as part of Spain’s short passing game.

More successful higher pressing…

Although Japan’s mid-block was outplayed by Spain’s buildup on more than a few occasions, it should be said that this is testament to the strength of Spain’s offensive scheme, rather than a complete condemnation of Japan’s set-up.

The basic compactness and shifting in Japan’s 4-4-2 was in many cases good. But on occasions where Pereira was able to get space to orient forward with the ball, Japan could not close the midfield gaps fast enough, again made more difficult by the good positioning of Spain’s midfield. The other main problems was the occasional issues in preventing Spain’s fullbacks playing back inside to the #6 after the ball went wide.

On the occasions where Japan were able to press higher against Spain’s buildup from the goalkeeper, they had a bit more success in forcing Spanish ball losses. Generally, Sugita would step up onto Spain’s #6 Torrecilla, while the Japan strikers attacked the centre-backs. With the closest options marked, Japan could force Spain’s keeper into attempting aerial passes into the fullbacks or midfield zones, which were not too successful.

…for both teams

Spain weren’t only strong with the ball, they were also able to stifle Japan’s buildup play with their own pressing.

Spain’s general pressing scheme is represented above. The starting positions of Spain’s #8s and their Japan counterparts naturally led them to marking their direct opponent in Japan’s buildup.

Meanwhile, Spain’s wingers Cardona and Caldentey would usually approach Japan’s center-backs diagonally from outside,  looking to block Japan’s centre-backs from playing passes into the fullbacks. Furthermore, Corredera and Batlle would be able to quickly push up to Japan’s fullbacks if longer passes from the goalkeeper went towards them.

The arrangement of Spain’s midfield and forward players often meant Japan were forced into chipped passes into the frontline, which had limited success. Where Japan did try to play out of the back, they gave up ball losses in their own half on a couple of occasions.

An interesting movement that Japan maybe could have utilised better than they actually did was the indenting of Endo from left-back. In certain scenes, to escape the cover shadow of Cardona, Endo could be seen drifting into the left halfspace.

With Spain’s right back being pinned by Nakajima, Endo could find find herself relatively free in these spaces. Unfortunately, Endo’s teammates were usually not attuned to seeking out these movements, and thus Japan did not explore this buildup solution as much as they perhaps could have.

Spain adjust despite good first half

Although the teams went in level thanks to Iwabuchi’s equaliser just before half-time, Spain had certainly impressed in the first half. Nevertheless, Spain made two personnel changes and a slight change in shape at the break.

Central midfielder Guijarro and left winger Caldentey were replaced by striker Lucia Garcia and winger Sheila Garcia. This saw a slight change of shape, as they shifted mainly to a 4-2-3-1.

Putella dropped slightly deeper to start alongside Torrecilla in midfield, while Hermoso now played as the #10 behind Lucia Garcia. Cardona initially swapped to the left wing, and Sheila Garcia was on the right.

The change saw a shift away from Spain’s slight right halfspace focus seen in the first half. This was firstly because although Hermoso often started from the right halfspace as a #10, she played a bit higher up than Guijarro had and offered less for passes from the defence. Secondly, Putella was now more focused on the left halfspace which gave an extra connection in this zone rather than the drifting across into the centre frequently seen in the first half.

Although Spain had clearly moved to a nominal 4-2-3-1 shape, there were still 4-3-3 permutations seen on both sides of the ball. In possession, Putella still had freedom to move forward through the left halfspace, leaving Torrecilla once again as the lone #6 in front of the defence. These forward movements saw Putella combine with Battle, who was more involved through her forward movements from left back in the second half, offering a lively attacking presence.

Without the ball, Hermoso could either operate as a #10 or drop back into central midfield. Initially she would look to mark Japan’s left central midfielder as Guijarro had in the first half, but when the opportunity came to press higher, Hermoso would push onto Japan’s centre-back and Torrecilla would step forward accordingly onto Japan’s midfielder.

The addition of Hermoso into more advanced zones when pressing did not discourage the wingers from moving aggressively against Japan’s centre-backs from outside as they had in the first half. This led to Spain’s second goal which came early in the second half, as a result of Cardona’s pressing against Japan’s right centre-back Kumagai, forcing her into an error which gave Lucia Garcia the chance to score.

The addition of Lucia Garcia generally gave Spain an added directness in attack, as Spain were able to successfully find her running into depth on a few occasions in the second half.

Conclusion

Japan made several changes of their own in the second half and Spain made further personnel switches as both teams made use of the six substitute allowance provided in this tournament.

Spain continued to impress though, and were able to wrap the game up with a third goal, again scored by Lucia Garcia.