In Mourinho’s first El Clasico as Real Madrid manager, his team were humiliated by Pep Guardiola’s legendary Barcelona side.

Barca’s structure

Although Barcelona nominally started the game in a 4-3-3, as always under Pep, their positional structure was more fluid than this.

When Barcelona were in their possession phase, Alves pushed aggressively high on the right wing. The remaining Barcelona defenders shifted to the right slightly and Abidal became the third centre-back.

Busquets occupied the #6 space in front of the defence as always. Xavi often dropped alongside or close to Busquets in order to receive the ball from the defence and use his press resistant qualities to help Barca escape any pressure that they faced. Iniesta usually remained higher in the left halfspace and was key to Barcelona being able to penetrate Madrid’s defence from their structure due to this positioning along with what was afforded by Madrid’s defensive shape (more on that soon).

Pedro and Villa’s roles were focused on pinning opponent players back by threatening with diagonal runs into depth. With Alves pushing up on the right side, Pedro often moved into more central areas, but almost always staying on the last line and threatening to run into depth. This was compatible with the role of Messi in his false #9 role taking up positions in the #10 space and the right halfspace while Pedro tried to stretch the defence in the other direction. Villa showed only occasional forays into centre-forward positions, because he was responsible for maintaining width on the left side in conjunction with Abidal’s aforementioned role as the third centre-back. From here he could still attempt diagonal runs into depth on the blindside of Ramos.

This was the usual structure for Barcelona initially, however an impressive aspect of their performance was the flexibility they had with their structure, and the understanding of the players of maintaining balance. For example there were scenes where Xavi would actually push higher in the right halfspace, so instead of playing aggressively on the wing Alves would stay deeper in the right halfspace to provide cover and Pedro stayed wider. If Abidal saw the opportunity to push up on the left, Iniesta dropped deeper and Villa moved into a centre-forward position. These adjustments are incredibly simple, but vital to maintaining a strong positional structure. Their flexibility (as well as how strong the initial structure was) allowed them the freedom to improvise situations where appropriate while still maintaining stability against counter-attacks and a well connected structure for ball-circulation.

Real’s reactive defence

Real’s defensive coverage strategy at the start was fairly passive with loose man-orientations in midfield when Barca players moved into a Real Madrid player’s zone of access. Within their defensive coverage was one of the key aspects of this game in terms of tactical dynamics – the behaviour of Madrid’s wingers, Ronaldo and Di Maria and how their positioning was dictated largely by that of their respective opposing full-backs.

Ronaldo, who started as the right winger in this game, remained fairly high up the pitch and didn’t track back into midfield. This matched the role of Abidal as the previously mentioned third centre-back, whose main role wasn’t to go forward and give overlaps. Of course, this type of role also isn’t uncharacteristic of Ronaldo. He is a player who will often ‘gamble’ on counter-attacks by staying in an advanced position when his team are out of possession so that he can quickly be the focal point of counter attacks either with dribbling or runs into depth. This can obviously have positive effects on his team’s counter-attacking game. This is also a role facilitated to him by his coaches, and it is very possible that the reason for Ronaldo being positioned on the right wing was that Mourinho knew that when facing Abidal he was unlikely to have to track back deep into his own half too often. This would’ve been a correct assumption to make for the most part, however Ronaldo’s high positioning against the ball caused Madrid massive defensive problems in other ways which are to be discussed shortly.

On the left side, Di Maria’s role was in stark contrast to that of Ronaldo. He played an incredibly passive role, tracking the forward runs of Dani Alves deep into his own half, even to the point of actually becoming part of a back 5 for Madrid.

Iniesta as the ‘free-man’

The clearest problem caused by Ronaldo’s gambling in the defensive phase was the amount of space it left for Iniesta to occupy and receive the ball in the left halfspace for Barcelona, especially in the first 20 minutes of the game. Barca often had an open passing lane available with which to access this space due to the distance between Ronaldo and centre-midfielder Khedira.

Iniesta’s own positional discipline was instrumental in Barca being able to create these advantageous situations. He didn’t constantly come to the ball and congest the areas around it, instead he moved away from the ball to create more space for the ball-carrier, while still trying to keep an open passing lane in order to still be an option. He was also happy to remain in ball-far zones, which again, can help to allow more space around the ball, as well as providing the possibility of a faster switch of play.

Another important aspect in creating this space for Iniesta was the aforementioned role of left-winger David Villa in manipulating the Madrid right-back Sergio Ramos. By starting from a very wide position and threatening with runs into depth, he could pin Ramos back, with the Madrid defender reluctant to step forward aggressively to deal with Iniesta, due to the risk of leaving space behind him for Villa to run beyond the defence.

Side note: the purpose of width (I)

Villa’s role, and Pep’s Barcelona in general, are a good example of how width and the wings can be utilised. Barca played with great width in their positional structure, stretching their effective playing area (the amount of space covered by the team’s structure) close to both touchlines. However, the function of this wide dispersal was not to attack down the wings – the function was to bind opponents into wide areas in order to create more space in the centre. This could also be expressed as: attracting opponents into less strategically valuable zones so that you can access more strategically valuable zones with greater ease.

Diagonality

The way the two teams were structured in this period of the game afforded for Barcelona to play diagonally in possession. Firstly, given Di Maria often being forced deeper and wider by Alves on Barcelona’s right, Barca could use this side of the pitch more often to start attacks from. Pique, who was on the right of Barca’s three-man defence in possession, was able to carry the ball forward into space on some occasions due to Di Maria’s passivity. Xavi, Pedro and Messi were also active in this area of the pitch in possession. Barca could also sometimes play from the centre, especially with Xavi dropping alonside Busquets to receive the ball from the defenders. Another flip-side of Ronaldo’s higher positioning was that it was slightly harder for Barcelona to build from their left. The space that existed to Pique to move forward on the right side did not exist for Abidal on the left, so Ronaldo’s positioning did help to block Barca from playing from that side.

However, it did not stop them from finalising their attacks there. Quite the opposite, as previously discussed. Barcelona, having began their buildup mostly on the right side or in central areas, could then look for diagonal passes to Iniesta in the left halfspace, or Villa on the left wing. The staggering of Barca’s midfield also afforded this, with Xavi’s deeper positioning towards the right allowing him to assist with ball-circulation there, and Iniesta’s positioning between the lines in the left halfspace allowing him to receive diagonal line-breaking passes there – another strength of Barca’s well-connected positional structure.

The benefits of such diagonality include being able to move the ball further up the pitch (i.e. progressing vertically) while also forcing your opponents to shift horizontally. There are also benefits for the person receiving a diagonal pass, as it is easier for them to receive with a body position which allows them to have both the ball and the opponent’s goal in their field of vision.

Goal analysis

Below is a video analysis of Barca’s first goal, in which the aspects talked about so far in this article manifest themselves to help create the breakthrough for Barca:

And a quick pictorial analysis of what happened leading up to Barca’s second goal:

Pep mirrors Jose

After Barcelona had made the score 2-0 in the 18th minute, both managers made tactical changes. Firstly Mourinho switched his two wingers, so Ronaldo was now playing on the left, and Di Maria on the right. Ronaldo’s behaviour in the defensive phase was similar to when he was playing on the right in terms of remaining fairly high, towards the last line, but he was more active in pressing, as Real Madrid as a team now adopted a slightly higher stance and a man-oriented press. As a result, Di Maria’s defensive behaviour was a bit less passive than it was on the left, at least during Madrid’s pressing moments.

The interesting thing was that Pep also made some slight structural alterations at this point, presumably in response to Mourinho’s changes. The most curious was that the two centre-backs, Pique and Puyol, switched sides. Pique, originally having been the right-sided centre-back, was now the left-sided centre-back, and Puyol went to the right. The reason for this isn’t obvious. Perhaps Guardiola felt that Pique might be able to continue to exploit the passivity that Di Maria had demonstrated thus far in the game, which had given the centre-half more space to carry the ball into in the halfspace and wider areas. This was not the case though, because Di Maria, as mentioned, was less passive now and was part of a higher and more intense Real Madrid press.

With Ronaldo pushed up on the left, Alves was more cautious in possession and assumed a deeper position. Barca were now closer to an orthodox 4-3-3 shape, as Abidal, although now playing wider again, rarely pushed as aggressively and as often on the left as Alves had previously done on the right. Having an extra player in the first line was also useful against Madrid’s man-oriented press, as having only four players in the first two lines would possibly have been quite unstable against Madrid in their 4-2-3-1.

The opening in the left halfspace that had existed due to Ronaldo’s positioning now existed in the right halfspace. However, it was not occupied as consistently as it had been by Iniesta in the left halfspace. Xavi is less inclined to remain in ball-far areas in possession than Iniesta, so they couldn’t always access this space through him. Instead, Messi occupied this space with increasing frequency.

Since making these changes, however, Madrid showed an improvement and were able to impose themselves on the game more than they had in the opening 20 minutes, where they were completely dominated and hardly had any possession phases of their own. The improvement was largely down to their higher pressing game, which despite not being as well constructed as Barca’s press (more on that soon), was effective in reducing Barca’s control over the game and allowed Madrid to at least establish some possession of their own.

It was curious then, in the 36th minute, that Mourinho swapped Ronaldo and Di Maria again. Guardiola also returned to his original formation. Madrid still continued to press though, and were still in the game much more than they were in the opening stages.

Barca’s option-oriented defending

After half-time Mourinho introduced Lassana Diarra in place of Ozil. As one would expect he took a slightly deeper position than Ozil, and played more as a left #8, with Alonso moving deeper, changing Madrid’s formation to a 4-3-3. They continued to press and pushed their defensive line higher, and as a result were able to get more possession phases of their own. These possession phases in themselves weren’t particularly interesting for Madrid’s part, but instead for the fact that it gave a chance to see Barca’s option-oriented pressing in action.

Barca’s main focus against the ball was to force their opponent away from the most strategically valuable spaces in the centre. This was successful in the game against Madrid, as they were able to confine Madrid to mostly u-shaped circulation between the centre-backs, defensive midfielders and wing players.

At all times the focus was on cutting passing lanes into the centre, and forcing Madrid to play down the wing. If the ball started with Madrid’s right centre-back for example, Iniesta would push out of midfield to pressure the ball. While he was doing this, Villa would indent himself, so that if the ball went to Madrid’s right-back, when Villa moved out to press he would be doing so from an angle that allowed him to cover the passing lane to the central player, which should only leave the right-back with the options of playing down the wing, or back to his centre-back.

Barca were not passive in their defending. They didn’t just protect the centre, they actively forced their opponents away from it. If the ball went to a wide position to the side of Barca’s defensive block, the central players aggressively pushed out to the ball. This was particularly noticeable with Busquets, who would vacate the #6 space to make these pressing runs to wide areas.

With the central players pushing out to pressure the ball, there is of course space left behind in the centre, however with the correct use of cover shadows the opponents can be prevented from accessing these spaces (this was easier against Madrid as they rarely occupied them properly anyway). The defensive line can also push up in order to make these spaces smaller.

Pressing the opponent while they have the ball on the wing also has the obvious advantage of the player on the ball only having a 180° radius of action due to being near  the touchline, which greatly reduces their options.

A good example of these aspects comes in the scenes leading up to Barca’s 4th goal:

As previously noted, these situations were made easier for Barca due to Madrid’s poor occupation of the centre inside Barca’s defensive block. Overall Madrid’s possession game was fairly limited, and they were forced to play hopeful long balls. A high diagonal pass to the head of Ronaldo was attempted on a couple of occasions, presumably due to the aerial superiority that Ronaldo should’ve been able to assert over Dani Alves. This was of very limited success, and of these passes led to the ball-loss which allowed Barca to score their 3rd goal. Long balls are not risk-free.

The purpose of width (II)

During the 2nd half, Barca used the wings as a means to escape pressure. They did this mostly through the full-backs, who were often free as Madrid’s wingers when pressing/defending occasionally found themselves in fairly high and narrow positions, unable to give proper coverage against Barca’s full-backs. As a result Barca were able to use their full-backs when they needed to escape from high pressure in the centre, which is where Madrid focused most of their pressing.

Barca’s press-resistance

In many cases, however, it wasn’t necessary for Barca to go to the wings to escape Madrid pressure. Particularly in the 2nd half Barcelona showed their incredible press-resistant qualities, both collectively and individually. There were also some problems with Madrid’s pressing.

The collective aspect of Barca’s press-resistance include aspects already discussed, such as the strong positional structures they create whilst still retaining fluidity in their positioning. In the second half Barca also created plenty of ball-near overloads in order to give multiple close options to the player on the ball, and additionally giving a strong position from which to counterpress with many bodies around the ball in the event of a loss of possession.

Their individual qualities, however, were also key in retaining total control of the game despite Real Madrid’s pressing efforts. The midfielders and Messi in particular, were unsurprisingly incredible in this aspect. They were willing and able to receive the ball while marked with their back to goal, and create separation from the pressuring player with the use of body feints, so that they were able to create more time for themselves, and if possible turn to get a better field of vision. They were able to attract pressure from multiple Madrid players, leaving their teammates free in the vacated space (see Xavi in buildup to first goal). Barca’s players didn’t just try to pass the ball, and therefore the pressure, onto the next teammate, they tried to hold onto the ball until they had created a situation in which they receiver would actually be in an advantageous position. They also very occasionally used diagonal dribbling, which creates a problem for defenders with regards to who should step out and deal with the dribbler, given that the player on the ball will most likely travel through the defensive zone of more than one player.

Problems with Madrid’s press, of course, did contribute to the ease with which Barca were able to play against it. In essence, many of the pressing movements were simply individual players reacting to the position of the ball, and running to pressure the ball. In contrast to the pressing of Barcelona, they did not use the cover shadows effectively to cut passing lanes while making pressing movements.

A problem experienced in deeper defending for Madrid was that Di Maria and Ronaldo now both remained high up the pitch when defending, and the midfield trio of Alonso, Khedira and Diarra were often left to cover very large amounts of space in midfield. Barca could also easily create overloads in these areas with the dropping of Messi into midfield.

Whilst plenty of teams can be described as press-resistant, most teams still end up having to concede some territory against a pressing team. They can keep the ball under pressure, but they have to use the goalkeeper a lot, recycling the ball back into deep positions in their own half to reorganise their structure so that they can continue with the ball. This is where Barcelona were possibly unique. Their ability to play in small, high pressured spaces is such that if you try to push up and pressure them to force them to play close to their own goal, you will most likely fail. They will simply continue to circulate the ball within your defensive block. Instead of recycling the ball all the way back to the goalkeeper in order to give them time to reorganise their attacking structure, they will use their individual press-resistant abilities to hold the ball until there is an appropriate option. Madrid found this for themselves during this game, again particularly in the second half. They were very keen to push their defensive line high at every opportunity, presumably hoping to play a pressing game close to Barca’s goal, which, for the reasons previously explained, did not work.

Conclusion

In one of the most famous El Clasico games of all time, Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona side showed a dominant performance both with and without the ball, which, combined with Madrid’s own tactical problems, contributed to a resounding 5-0 win against their biggest rivals.

Read next: Tactical analysis of Marcelo Bielsa’s Athletic Club Bilbao

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