Sunderland vs Manchester City may not have been the blockbuster tie of the weekend, with Sunderland rooted to the bottom of the table, and Manchester City being a far superior team. However it was an important match for Manchester City, as the teams directly above and below them, Spurs and Liverpool, had both won big games this weekend, therefore this wasn’t the sort of game Pep Guardiola’s side could afford to drop points in.
City succeed in buildup
A key part of the game for any Pep Guardiola team is the buildup phase, and having the ability to ensure a clean progression of the ball from the first line as the team moves up the pitch together. Against Sunderland, Guardiola’s side found it relatively easy to play out of pressure effectively due to the way they were able to exploit faults in Sunderland’s pressing scheme. They had two main ways of doing this – depending on which centre-back had the ball.
The first way in which City were able to bypass Sunderland’s press involved progressing on the left side, starting with Kolarov as the ball carrier. Sunderland’s pressing scheme when Kolarov had the ball was a lopsided one – firstly Ndong would mark Toure who usually dropped between the centre backs in buildup or at least stayed close in front, which left Defoe to stay close to Stones, meaning that it was Januzaj who would move up to press Kolarov. When he did this, he was careful to keep Clichy in his cover shadow as he stepped up, in an attempt to avoid a direct pass to the now-free Clichy. He was successful in this, however it was also very simple for City to beat – once Januzaj had moved out of position, Kolarov would give a flat pass to Toure, or Silva if he was dropping to receive the ball, who could then easily shift the ball out to Clichy, who had time and space on the ball, as the next nearest Sunderland players – Larsson and Jones, had to mark Silva and Sane respectively. From here Clichy could take the ball forward and combine with Sane on the wing, or send a pass back inside if one of the central midfielders had gotten free.
City could also conduct this combination using the goalkeeper when they had the ball in deeper areas – the backwards pass would go to Caballero who had full view of the field, and could send a chipped pass towards Clichy. Another alternative, if the appropriate passing options were not available, was that Kolarov would simply dribble the ball forward, with the intention of attracting pressure before releasing the ball to a more open player. Kolarov did this very effectively on two or three occasions in the first half, demonstrating strong ball-carrying skills to retain possession.
The second method was used when Stones had the ball, and is one we have seen recently from Manchester City, notably in their Champions League game against Monaco. Borini was less aggressive with his pressing than the opposite winger, Januzaj. He wouldn’t often move to close down Stones when he had the ball, instead he remained more passive, staying close to Sagna. Ndong again tried to track Toure, which left Defoe, who also didn’t make great effort to pressure Stones – who therefore often had time on the ball. The main idea here was for Stones to pick out the dropping movement of Aguero, who was able to move into the space between Sunderland’s central midfielders, due to their poor ball-orientations, and focus on their direct opponent as a reference point, which caused them to leave a large space between them. On receiving the ball, Aguero would play a simple bounce pass, either to Toure or Fernandinho, who had moved on the blindside of their marker.
Overall Sunderland’s press was poorly constructed. City were able to find these buildup solutions easily and often, sometimes having another midfielder drop into the first line if necessary, who was often not marked closely enough by the Sunderland player following him. Sunderland also didn’t make use of directional pressing, which can be effective against teams such as Manchester City in order to force them to buildup on one side, reducing the size of the playing area which they can play in, making it much easier to defend. Instead, City were able to switch the point of buildup relatively easily through Caballero, or sometimes Toure, which gave the central defenders time on the ball in order to play forward.
City’s general idea in attack after the buildup phase was to get their wingers, Sterling and Sane, into isolation situations against the opposition full backs – another key feature of Pep Guardiola’s teams. They could sometimes create these situations more directly, with long diagonal passes from City’s centre backs, both strong ball players. City were able to earn their first goal through such a situation, when Sterling was able to confront Oviedo with the ball at his feet, and finding a low cross to Aguero who had made the run to the near post.
Toure and Fernandinho switch positions
After around the 20th minute Yaya Toure, who started as nominally as a #6, and Fernandinho, an #8, swapped positions. Obviously I can only speculate on the reasons for this, but I can think of a couple of possibilities. A few minutes earlier, Januzaj had picked up the ball in transition and very skillfully beaten two Manchester City players, including Yaya Toure, proceeding to nearly find Defoe with a through ball. Toure’s weakness in defensive transition is fairly well known, and Pep may have wanted to have a better ball-winner in such positions to avoid a risky counter attacking situation like the one involving Januzaj. Secondly, it is possible that Pep simply wanted to see Toure in a more advanced role, picking up the ball from the likes of Aguero with layoffs as mentioned earlier, where he is then more free in the #8 role to drive forward with the ball and combine with the forwards.
Sunderland fail to threaten with right-sided attack
On the topic of Sunderland’s attack, the aforementioned event with Januzaj beating Toure essentially summed up their attacking approach in the game – namely, find Januzaj, preferably in transition where he has space to dribble or find Defoe running into depth. Their attack was predictably ineffective for the most part. According to WhoScored, 53% of Sunderland’s attacks came from the right side where Januzaj was playing, which backs up the idea of Sunderland’s attacks having a right-sided focus. However on a side note, I am skeptical of this kind of statistic from WhoScored, without knowing their methodology, or what exactly constitutes a ‘Right Side’ attack by their metric.
Sunderland also struggled to build any kind of move through midfield. This isn’t exactly unexpected, due to the poor quality of the playing personnel, and the style of the coach. Man City’s pressing was effective in aggravating this issue though, as the central midfielders in particular, when pressing Sunderland’s centre backs, used their cover shadows to cut the passing option to Sunderland’s nearest centre midfielder, and Aguero’s position between the centre backs eliminated the option to switch sides. Most of Sunderland’s attacks were either in transition, as mentioned, poor attempts at wing play, or hopeful long balls.
Conclusion
Following City’s second goal, scored by Sane in the 58th minute, the tempo of the match dropped substantially. The last half-hour was played without much energy, with Sunderland’s press becoming disjointed an disinterested. City were able to play in large spaces, with a lot of time on the ball, between short and uninspiring spells of Sunderland possession. In the end the game went largely as expected, allowing Pep’s side to maintain a healthy position in the top four. As for Sunderland, they remain at rock-bottom, with problems both in terms of tactics, and the deficiencies of many individual players.